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Abstract
In this work we present a model for the evacuation of pedestrians from an
enclosure considering a continuous space substrate and discrete time. We
analyze the influence of behavioral features that affect the use of the empty
space, that can be linked to the attitudes or characters of the pedestrians. We
study how the interaction of different behavioral profiles affects the needed
time to evacuate completely a room and the occurrence of clogging. We find
that neither fully egotistic nor fully cooperative attitudes are optimal from
the point of view of the crowd. In contrast, intermediate behaviors provide
lower evacuation times. This lead us to identify some phenomena closely
analogous to the faster-is-slower effect. The proposed model enables for the
introduction of Game Theory elements to solve conflicts between pedestrians
which try to occupy the same space. Moreover, it allows for distinguishing
between the role of the attitudes in the search for empty space and the
attitudes in the conflicts. In the present version we only focus on the first of
these instances.
1. Introduction
During the last decade there has been a multiplication of mathematical
models for pedestrian dynamics and enclosure evacuation aiming at unveiling
the most relevant aspects affecting such processes. Despite the fact that all
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these models represent similar processes (or even the same), they implement
different methodologies with their corresponding strengths and limitations.
The consideration of behavioral aspects related to the interactions be-
tween individuals has produced some notable contributions in the area [1, 2].
In particular, using a mechanistic approach, the so called social-force model
[2, 3, 4, 5] captures the fact that the motion of an agent is governed by the
desire of reaching a certain destination and by the influence it suffers from
the environment, which includes the other agents. The model links the col-
lective motion of the individuals to self-driven many particle systems (see [6]
and references therein). In order to simplify the calculations, advances have
also been maid with cellular automaton models [7, 8].
Recently, some attention was drawn upon the fact that a full description
of the behavioral aspects involved in an evacuation process needs to consider
the disposition of the individuals as internal states which may influence the
responses of the pedestrians and, ultimately, their motion (see, for exam-
ple, [9]). The idea is that not only the environment but also the internal
motivations govern their reactions [10]. Thus, some of the interactions be-
tween two or more individuals in a moving crowd can be thought as conflicts
which the pedestrians can tackle using different strategies, according to their
characters or attitudes. These considerations have naturally led to the in-
clusion of Game Theory elements in the models for pedestrian dynamics.
The first works considering Game Theory within evacuation models [11, 12]
analyzed the emergence of pushing behavior in evacuation situations. Sub-
sequently, several authors analyzed various aspects of the complex subject of
linking individual nature to crowd dynamics [13, 19, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18] using
Game Theory. All these works considered two available strategies for each
pedestrian. Namely, a cooperative one and a defecting one. The coopera-
tive strategy is normally associated to kind and patient behavior consisting
in not looking for taking advantage from others, and, specially, not rushing
to an empty space when a favorable move is available [13, 17]. Conversely,
the defective strategy can represent an impatient pedestrian, who rushes to
conquer gaps, disrespectful to others.
In a slightly different context, it was suggested recently [21] that, despite
the success of the models based on the Social forces paradigm, more sim-
ple assumptions could lead to highly satisfactory predictions of pedestrian
behavior. In [21], the authors consider that the reaction of an individual is
mostly governed by the visually perceived environment, and that a pedes-
trian, instead of being repelled by the neighbors, actively looks for empty
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space or free paths through the crowd. Hence, from different points of view,
the attitude of the individuals toward the empty space (i.e. the way in which
pedestrians use and let use the available space) arise as a character-dependent
key element influencing the dynamics.
Clearly, a strategy of motion reflecting the complex behavior of a pedes-
trian cannot be determined by a unique feature within a model. Several
aspects should be included in order to define the use of space and the at-
titude of the pedestrian in conflicts or competitions for space. Part of the
object of this work is to understand how some of the different elements which
may conform a strategic profile affect the dynamics of an evacuation process
when considered separately. This means, to disentangle such different com-
ponents, and move towards a better understanding of the emerging results.
With this in mind we develop a spatially-continuous discrete-time model
for pedestrian dynamics that enables for the analysis of the influence of the
individual attitudes at different stages of the evacuation dynamics. These
stages include the decisions made at the presence of available space that pro-
motes a favorable move, and the strategy adopted if confronted with conflicts
that may derive from these decisions. More specifically, the model considers
two different stages at which the attitudes of the pedestrians can be intro-
duced. First, a stage at which each pedestrian decides its attempt of motion
according to the preferred direction, the available free space perceived, and
reflecting its degree of rationality, patience, cooperativeness or aggressive-
ness. Second, a stage at which the conflicts among individuals that attempt
to move to overlapped positions are solved. This second stage could in princi-
ple include Game Theory elements to reflect the character of the pedestrians
and their fitnesses to win the competitions. However, as a first approach, in
this work we solve the conflicts at random and focus on the analysis of the
aspects involved in the first stage. At such a first level, the actual behavioral
patterns of pedestrians, which may include cooperative or egotistic attitudes
and rational or impulsive decision making, are incorporated in the model
through different deterministic or noisy ways of deciding the attempts of mo-
tion. The selfish or cooperative attitude is mimicked at this level through
an aggressive or coordinated management of the available space to move. In
particular, we focus on the analysis of the effects of the randomness and the
rationality in the use of empty space to move, with a connotation that will
become clear later. We also study the influence of the minimal separation
threshold considered by the pedestrians for attempting a step. This parame-
ter is related to the inclination of the individuals to avoid collision with other
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pedestrians and, thus, to their degree of cooperativeness or politeness.
In agreement with the suggestions in [21], the proposed model starts
from very simple assumptions and a small number of parameters. Moreover,
given that it considers finite-size pedestrians in a continuous-space, it can be
thought as more realistic than most cellular automaton models. Furthermore,
as mentioned before, it enables for the inclusion of Game Theory formalism
to solve the conflicts which emerge in the competition for space. Due to these
properties, we believe that the model can be relevant for the analysis of many
aspects of pedestrian dynamics beyond those studied in this work. Moreover,
by considering appropriate adaptations and more complex geometries, it may
constitute a useful tool for the design of actual spaces and buildings.
2. The model
We consider a spatially continuous model of N pedestrians, represented
by rigid disks of radius r = d/2, occupying a square room of size L with a
single door. In (x, y)-coordinates, the walls are located at x = ±L/2, y = 0
and y = L, while the exit is in the middle of the y = 0 wall, running from
(−ld/2, 0) to (ld/2, 0). The time is discretized in steps of duration δt = 1
(in arbitrary units) while the space is continuous so that the position of the
center of the disks can be any point in the room. We analyze two versions
of the same basal model, that will be referred to as rational and stochastic.
In both cases, the individuals head towards the door in order to leave the
room. More precisely, a walker located at position ~r = (x, y) heads towards
the point ~rE at the exit, which is defined as ~rE = (0, 0) if |x| ≥ ld/2 or as
~rE = (x, 0) if |x| < ld/2.
The formulation for the rational model is the following. At each time
step, each walker selects a desired position to which he/she will attempt to
move. For this, the walker first explores the possibility of moving in the
direction of the exit, and if it is not possible, he/she explores the possibility
of making a lateral motion. This is done with the following algorithm. Let ~ri
be the position of the walker i at time t, which is represented by the center of
the circle in the sketch in Fig. 1. We define uˆE = (~rE −~ri)/|~rE −~ri| (i.e. the
direction towards ~rE). As a first attempt, the walker selects a direction of
motion uˆ, which is randomly chosen within an angle of amplitude η around
uˆE (i.e. η/2 to each side), as shown in Fig. 1. Note that this implies
that we consider an uncertainty or randomness in the way the pedestrians
point toward the exit, which is characterized by the parameter η. Then,
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the walker analyzes what is the maximum distance he/she can move in the
direction uˆ without overlapping another walker (for this we consider all the
walker’s positions at time t). If such a distance is larger than a threshold µ d
(0 < µ < 1), the desired position for the walker i is set as ~ri + λuˆ. Here,
λ > µd is the size of the desired step, which is set as long as possible up
to a maximum distance d (i.e. µ d < λ < d). Conversely, if the maximum
distance allowed in the direction uˆ is smaller than µ d, the walker attempts
for a lateral motion (see Figure 1). For this, he/she randomly selects one
of the two directions perpendicular to uˆ, here referred to as uˆ⊥. Then, the
walker checks the maximum distance allowed for a motion in the direction
uˆ⊥. If this results larger than µ d, the desired position is set as ~ri + λuˆ⊥.
Instead, if there is a blockage, the walker will not attempt for moving in the
considered time step, and he/she will remain at position ~ri at time t+ δt.
Once all the individuals have defined the positions for their motion at-
tempts, we have to check for the possibility of conflicts. Note that a conflict
may arise when the desired positions of two or more walkers overlap. In
such a case, the conflict is solved by selecting at random one of the walkers
involved, which will be finally allowed to move. The rest of the individuals
in the conflict will remain at their original positions. Note that, according
to what was indicated in the introduction, this is the stage of the model
at which Game Theory could be included to solve the conflicts, as done for
instance in [17].
It is worth remarking that the rational model includes two main parame-
ters defining the stepping dynamics. Namely, the angle η characterizing the
randomness in the pointing toward the exit by the walkers, and µ (0 < µ < 1),
which defines the threshold distance (µd) for attempting a step.
Now we introduce the stochastic model, whose main difference with the
rational one is that the attempt for a lateral motion is decided at random
instead of being a consequence of the impossibility of making a forward mo-
tion. The algorithm is the following. At each time step, for each walker, the
directions uˆ and uˆ⊥ are defined using uˆE and η, just as in the deterministic
case. Then, each walker is set to attempt for a lateral motion (direction uˆ⊥)
with probability α or for a forward motion (direction uˆ) with probability
(1 − α). If the available distance in the chosen direction is larger than µd,
the walker will attempt for a step of length λ in such direction. In contrast,
if there is a blockage, the walker will not attempt for moving. After all the
individuals have defined their desired positions, the conflicts are solved in
the same way as for the rational model.
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Figure 1: Scheme showing the direction of frontal and lateral movements and the uncer-
tainty introduced by η
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Two things should be stressed. First in addition to the parameters η and µ
of the rational model, the stochastic model has a third parameter α (0 ≤ α ≤
1), which defines the probability of attempting a lateral movement. Second,
the random choice between the directions uˆ and uˆ⊥ reflects an irrational
behavior of the pedestrian. Note that the available distance is checked only
in the randomly chosen direction.
For both models, as initial condition we consider random positions for
the N pedestrians within the room, taking care of avoiding overlapping.
The parameters µ, η, and also α for the stochastic case, define the way
in which the pedestrians decide their attempts of motion. Thus, they can be
interpreted as dependent on the characters of the pedestrians. For instance, a
relatively large value of µ could be related to a more respectful (cooperative)
attitude than a low value of µ, since a walker with larger µ is more careful
in avoiding physical interaction with the pedestrians in the direction he/she
moves. Similarly, larger values of η or α indicate a lower propensity for
moving straight to the exit, so that this may be also attributed to a more
cooperative attitude. The predisposition of the individuals can be naturally
introduced in the model to define the strategy of motion, that affect both
the decision making process when searching for empty space to move (ruled
by the parameters µ, η and α), and the attitude or strategy during a conflict
resolution. As indicated in the introduction, in this work we focus on the
effects observed only during the first case. Our definition of cooperative and
defective attitudes alludes to the observed behavior during the choice of the
next move and not to deeper internal motivations that the individuals may
have. In this sense, walking straight to the exit ignoring the presence of
the others is the most intuitive and obvious interpretation of an egotistic
attitude.
3. Results
3.1. Exit times and dependence on the parameters.
We begin by analyzing the dependence of the mean evacuation time (or
exit time) on η within the two models. For this we consider a fixed value
µ = 0.1 and different values of α in the case of the stochastic model. The
effects of varying that threshold µ will be studied later. The results are shown
in Figure 2.
First we observe that, for any value of α, the stochastic model results
in longer exit times than the rational one. As we show later, this result is
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independent of the values of the rest of the parameters with the exception
of very small values of µ. We can affirm that, in most cases, the rational
behavior is strategically more effective than the stochastic one (both for each
individual and for the crowd).
Figure 2 also show us that the evacuation time has a non monotonic
behaviour, adopting a minimal value for an intermediate value of η. This
indicates that the presence of certain limited amount of noise improves the
overall performance of the pedestrians, but the effect is reversed once η ex-
ceeds a critical value, i.e., with an increase in the uncertainty when choosing
the moving direction. This can be understood by considering that for very
small η, the desired directions of movement of several pedestrians can point
to similar targets, increasing the possibility of blockage, while large uncer-
tainties can lead to unnecessary winding of the trajectories increasing the
exit time. We have verified the robustness of this result against changes in
µ, as shown later, in the sizes of the door and the room and in the number
of pedestrians.
Additionally, we observe that for the stochastic model there is an optimal
non-negligible value of α that minimizes the exit time. To observe this more
clearly we present in Figure 3 the information about exit times for different
values of η as a function of α. Qualitatively, the dependence of the exit time
on α has the same behavior for any value of η. There is always an optimal
value that minimizes the exit time and that is almost constant for a given
size of the door. For example, for ld = 6d, the optimal value is α ≈ 0.47
with only small variations (less than 7.5%) as a function of η, as shown in
the inset of Figure 3.
For that optimal situation, the resulting exit time is of the order of the one
found for the rational model, and even the dependence on η is qualitatively
the same, as shown in Figure 2 for stochastic and rational agents. However,
this is not the case for lower and higher values of α. On the one hand, when
α is very low, the whole group of pedestrians might end up in a clogged
configuration or, with some intermittences, stay blocked until a noisy event
helps to clear the blockage. We have observed these two effects in several
simulations.
As mentioned before, the increase in the exit time is mainly due to a noisy
wandering behavior (more evident for the stochastic version of our model) or
to the occurrences of blockages due to the lack of space for the pedestrians
to move. The first can be tuned by the amount of noise considered in the
dynamics (characterized by the parameters η and α). This, in turn, also
8
0 . 0 0 . 2 0 . 4 0 . 6 0 . 8 1 . 03 0 0
1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
0 . 0 0 . 1 0 . 2 0 . 3 0 . 4
4 8 0
5 0 0
5 2 0
 
 
exit
 tim
e
η pi - 1
 α=0.02 α=0.1 α=0.55 α=0.7  r a t i o n a l  
 
exit
 tim
e
η pi - 1
Figure 2: Mean evacuation time for the rational and stochastic models as a function of
η/pi. Here each curve corresponds to a different choice of α with µ = 0.1, while the solid
black curve with white circles corresponds to the rational version of the model, zoomed
in the inset. The results were obtained by averaging over 1000 realizations, considering a
room of size L = 100 with a door of size ld = 6d filled to a 40% of its capacity, containing
N = 1000 agents.
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Figure 3: Mean evacuation time for the stochastic model as a function of α with µ = 0.1.
We consider different values of η. The results were obtained by averaging over 1000
realizations, considering a room of size L = 100 with a door of size ld = 6d filled to a
40% of its capacity, containing N = 1000 agents. The inset shows a zoom of the curve
corresponding to the rational case
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Figure 4: Mean evacuation time for the rational model as a function of η/pi for different
values of µ. The results were obtained by averaging over 1000 realizations, considering a
room of size L = 100 with a door of size ld = 6d filled to a 40% of its capacity, containing
N = 1000 agents.
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Figure 5: Mean evacuation time as a function of µ. Here each curve corresponds to a
different choice of η. We show the rational and the stochastic cases, for the last one, the
case when α is optimum. The horizontal axis is in units of d−1. The results were obtained
by averaging over 1000 realizations, considering a room of size L = 100 with a door of size
ld = 6d filled to a 40% of its capacity, containing N = 1000 agents.
12
0.001 0.01 0.1 1
µ
400
600
800
1000
1200
e
xi
t t
im
e
ld = 2d
ld = 4d
ld = 6d
ld = 8d
ld = 10d
2 4 6 8 10
ld d
-1
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
µ0
0.01 0.1 1
α
500
1000
7000
e
xi
t t
im
e
2 4 6 8 10
ld d
-1
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
α0
(a)
(b)
rational
stochastic
Figure 6: Mean evacuation time a) for the rational case and as a function of µ, b) for
the stochastic case as a function of α. The results were obtained by averaging over 1000
realizations, considering a room of size L = 100 and different door sizes, as shown in b).
The room contained N = 1000 agents. 13
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Figure 7: Snapshots for different instances of the evacuation process with rational agents
(black circles) for different values of µ and η = pi/8. The red dots represent the conflicts
between two or more agents that are solved randomly with just one them advancing to
the desired position. The green square represents de position and width of the door at
the bottom wall of the room with L = 100 and ld = 6d. The initial condition on the
left column is the same in all cases, with the room filled to a 40% of its capacity with
N = 1000 agents, while the blue curve corresponds to the trajectory of one of the agents
until it leaves the room.
affects the distribution of the available space and consequently the number
of blockages. Still, there is something else we can do to prevent clogging.
Namely, to increase the parameter µ, which characterizes the minimal empty
space that a given individual has to observe for attempt a motion in certain
direction.
In Figure 4 we show the exit-time vs. η curves for several values of µ
within the rational model. We observe that the effect of preserving certain
distance from the other pedestrians favors the evacuation speed unless this
distance is too large and so the restriction has a completely different effect:
the effective free space to move is reduced to the point that no one can move.
As a consequence, the dependence of the exit time on µ shows that there is
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Figure 8: Snapshots for different instances of the evacuation process with stochastic agents
(black circles) for different values of α, µ = 0.1, and η = pi/8. The red dots represent
the conflicts between two or more agents that are solved randomly with just one them
advancing to the desired position. The green square represents de position and width of
the door at the bottom wall of the room with L = 100 and ld = 6d. The initial condition
on the left column is the same in all cases, with the room filled to a 40% of its capacity
with N = 1000 agents, while the blue curve corresponds to the trajectory of one of the
agents until it leaves the room.
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an optimal value (µ ≈ 0.6 for a door of size ld = 6d). When µ > 0.75 there
is a considerable proportion of realizations that show transient or permanent
blockages. Surprisingly, this phenomenon is not replicated when considering
the stochastic model, for which increasing the value of µ results always in a
longer exit time, as shown in Figure 5. This fact might be indicating that
the randomness in the lateral motion (measured by α) is already efficient in
creating empty spaces and adding the effect of µ results also in an effective
reduction of the available space as µ increases. Although Figure 5 only shows
the exit time for α = 0.55, we have studied what happens for several other
values of α observing in all the cases the same behavior.
We must mention that the optimal value for µ in the case of rational
agents (see Figure 5), or for α in the case of stochastic ones (see Figure 3),
depends on the size of the door ld as shown in Figure 6. In particular, the
insets in the figure shows the dependence of the position of the minimal, µ0
and α0, as a function of ld for the rational and stochastic cases, respectively.
As apparent from the figure, these results suggest that, in order to optimize
the flow of pedestrians out of the room in an evacuation situation, one needs
only to control the mean distance among the pedestrians in relation to the
size of the door itself (and the mean diameter of the agents): the narrower
the door, the more distance is required among agents to keep an optimal flow
through the door.
Now let us go back to the interpretations of large and small values of
the parameters µ, η and α as signatures of cooperative or egotistic behavior,
respectively. From this point of view, the fact that we find non vanishing
values of these parameters minimizing the exit time indicates that neither
the most egotistic nor the most cooperative behavior of individuals is optimal
from the perspective of the crowd. In the following section we analyze the
connection of this results with a well known effect observed in evacuation
processes.
3.2. Analogies with the faster-is-slower effect
The so called faster-is-slower effect, originally predicted in [2], is asso-
ciated to the fact that the optimal evacuation time through a narrow door
is minimized at a given critical value at which the pedestrians try to move
[5, 22]. Hence, for desired velocities above the critical one, we have that the
larger the velocity, the slower the evacuation process. This effect has been
recently confirmed experimentally for many different systems [23], suggest-
ing that this phenomenon as a universal behavior for active matter passing
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through a narrowing.
As we now indicate, some of the simulations results presented before have
clear analogies with the faster-is-lower effect. In the present model, the speed
of movement is not a parameter as in [2], it is always d though the moves
might be limited due to the lack of free space. The haste of the pedestrian
to leave the room is captured in different ways by the model parameters. For
instance, a small value of µ indicates an impatient or hurried behavior, since
the pedestrians try to take advantage of every empty space available, without
caring about the distance to other individuals. Meanwhile, low values of η
and α ( only in the stochastic model) indicate a propensity to walk straight to
the exit, and a low disposition to perform lateral motions or temporal turn
offs which may benefit the whole group. Thus, for instance, the increase
in the exit time with decreasing µ obtained for the rational model at low
values of µ resemble the faster-is-slower effect. The same can be said about
the increasing of the exit time obtained for decreasing α observed within the
random model at small α, or the increasing with decreasing η for both models
at small η. It is worth saying that in the three cases there is a region where the
exit time decrease monotonically, until reaching the critical values at which
the faster is slower effect starts to be observed. This monotonic behaviour
has been observed when the the pedestrians only show a moderated haste
[24].
To understand the dynamical properties that lead to the faster-is-slower-
like effect at small values of the parameters, we analyze in more detail the
evolution of the populations and individual position for various simulations.
In Figures 7 and 8 we present snapshots of different instances of the evacua-
tion process for the rational and stochastic models, respectively, considering
the same initial condition. The bottom row presents the optimal situation in
each case for the value of η and ld (and µ for the stochastic case) considered.
Notice how the generation of available space between the agents, through
the threshold for the rational case (associated with the parameter µ) or by
performing random lateral movements for the stochastic one (associated with
the parameter α), speeds up the evacuation process.
Moreover, these results put in evidence an interesting fact regarding the
effects of µ on the rational agents. As mentioned before, if a rational agent
cannot advance towards the door a distance of at least µ, it will opt for a lat-
eral movement. In contrast, a stochastic agent will randomly chose a lateral
movement depending only on the value of α. In both cases the agent will
stay still if it cannot advance a distance of at least µ in the chosen direction.
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Please notice that, for the stochastic agents, this threshold has been taken
into account with µ = 0.1 in the figure. Nonetheless, the rational agents
require a larger value of µ to optimize their exit time, as their decision mak-
ing process regarding the implementation of frontal or lateral movements is
tied to this parameter, contrary to what happens with the stochastic agents.
Therefore, this points to the fact that it is the implementation of a sizable
amount of lateral movements in both cases, with the consequent generation
of space among agents, the most important feature to optimize the exit time
of the whole group.
In each of the plots in the first columns of Figs. 7 and 8, we also show the
trajectory for one of the agents (blue solid curves). It can be seen that the
trajectories for the stochastic model are more winding that those from the
rational one. This leads to the larger exit times observed in the stochastic
model.
The faster-is-slower-like effects reminds us of social dilemmas. This means,
situations in which there is a conflict between individual and collective in-
terests. In a social dilemma, each individual receives a higher payoff for a
socially defecting choice than for a socially cooperative choice, no matter
what the other individuals do, but all individuals are all better off if all co-
operate than if all defect. The payoff to be selfish is higher than the payoff
to be non-selfish, but group members are worse off if everyone is selfish than
if everyone is not [27, 28]. In an evacuation scenario, the individuals would
in principle always profit from moving in a faster way to the exit, but if
everybody does the same, the result is an increase in the evacuation time, a
collective disadvantage.
4. Final remarks and conclusions.
Recently it was suggested that formalisms with more simple assumptions
than the Social Force model could lead to satisfactory predictions of pedes-
trian behavior [21]. In that paper, the authors assume that the reactions of
the pedestrians are mostly governed by the visually perceived environment
and the active search for empty spaces. The present work points in the same
direction. In the models here proposed, the movement of the pedestrians is
driven by the wish of reaching the exit and the seek for empty space to move,
and limited by the competition for space with other pedestrians.
Due to their relevance, the behavioral aspects involving the character
and internal motivations of the pedestrians has call the attention of scientist
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interested in modeling evacuation processes. The most simple but powerful
approximation is to consider that there are two types of characters, prompted
sometimes as defectors and collaborators or patient and impatient. Those two
archetypes represent the usual conflict presented in any social dilemma: the
compromise between the collective and the individual interest and the choice
to favor one or the other. A given behavioral profile or strategy of motion,
however, result from a combination of several factors that are reflected in
and affect the pedestrian dynamics in different ways. The present work tries
to disentangle these effects to promote a better understanding of the results.
First, our model helps us to distinguish between the behavioral features
affecting the decision making processes associated to the selection of the next
move, and those associated to the behavior at conflicts in the competition
for space. To emphasize the relevance of the distinction between these two
levels of behavior, we can imagine two extreme but possible attitudes of a
pedestrian. First, we can think on an individual who is inpatient or unkind
in his/her search for space, but who avoid physical contact and, thus, acts as
a cooperative person in conflicts. This behavior could correspond to that of
a disrespectful but coward individual. On the other hand, we can think on
an individual who is gentle in his/her search for possibilities of motion, and
tries to avoid conflicts but who becomes a strong competitor in any conflict
in which he/she is forced to enter.
Our studies focus on the analysis of the influence of different behavioral
features arising on the first stage, i.e. on the use of empty space. At this level,
the recognition of available spaces and the decision processes for stepping
is affected by the internal moods and character of the individuals. The
consequences of these internal states on the stepping behavior are modeled
through a set of independent parameters defining the dynamics. Namely,
µ, which characterizes the tendency to keep distance from others, η, which
measures the fluctuations in the definition of the preferred direction, and α,
which defines the probability of a lateral movement (only for the random i.e.
no rational model). We have argued that low values of these parameters can
be associated to impatient or defective behaviors while relatively large values
correspond to more cooperative attitudes. Our results show that, in most
cases, the exit time is minimized at intermediate values of the parameters,
indicating that neither the most cooperative nor the most defective attitudes
are optimal from the point of view of the crowd. We have then argued that the
existence of regions of the parameters for which the exit time grows with the
hurry or impatience of the pedestrians indicates global behaviors analogous to
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the faster is slower effect. We have shown that a thorough explanation of the
slowing down of an evacuation process is due to an amalgam of several effects
but ultimately connected to the reduction of the available empty space.
As part of our studies we have shown that a distance preserving attitude
favors the evacuation by inhibiting the clogging. Perhaps one of the most in-
teresting implication of this results is the possibility that, by communicating
simple basic instructions to the pedestrians, the evacuation process can be
optimized. If people could overcome panic by having clear instructions, the
behavior associated to the rational walker with the addition of maintaining
certain distance from others would clearly help.
As a final remark, we want to emphasize the claim given in the intro-
duction concerning the utility that the model here developed may have for
studying general features of pedestrians dynamics, as well as for particular
applications.
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